

Fatema Amijee

Plural Explanation in Leibniz

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason ('PSR'), every fact has a sufficient reason for why it obtains rather than does not obtain. Leibniz subscribes to the PSR, yet claims that nothing in the world—taken as a series of contingent things—can be a sufficient reason for the existence of any contingent thing. Leibniz further claims that this is because a contingent thing can never completely explain another contingent thing. I first develop Leibniz's conception of a complete explanation. I then argue that this conception, along with his commitment to the PSR and to the existence of contingent things, commits Leibniz to plural explanation—the view on which the totality of contingent things is sufficiently explained plurally, yet each individual contingent thing lacks an explanation when taken on its own. I thereby highlight a limitation on Leibniz's commitment to the PSR.

In developing Leibniz's conception of a complete explanation, I first show that Leibniz's conception of a sufficient reason is remarkably stable and remains constant over a period that ranges from c. 1671-72 through to his mature metaphysics in the early 1700s. In particular, I show that a sufficient reason for a thing, for Leibniz, (at least partially) consists in the totality of the thing's necessary causal conditions, and that this requirement on a sufficient reason is a constant in Leibniz's philosophy. I then discuss why Leibniz thinks that no contingent thing can explain the existence of other contingent things and rule out three candidate explanations. According to the first candidate explanation, even after we have provided an explanation (by appealing to a contingent thing) for the existence of every contingent thing, there still remains a residual question about why the entire series of contingent things—as a reified entity over and above its members—exists. A complete explanation (or sufficient reason) must also explain this reified series. According to the second candidate explanation, a contingent thing cannot explain the existence of another contingent thing without circularity. According to the third candidate explanation, the existence of the aggregate of contingent things is explanatorily prior to the existence of any contingent thing, and so a complete explanation for the existence of any contingent thing must also include an explanation for the existence of the aggregate.

I argue against all three candidate answers, and show that this negative result, together with the claim that a sufficient reason for a thing (at least partially) consists in the totality of necessary causal conditions of that thing, commits Leibniz to plural explanation. I end the paper by discussing some upshots of this conclusion for the strength of Leibniz's commitment to the PSR.

Lucinda Nicolls

Descartes on Infant and Adult Thought

Descartes is famous for placing thought at the heart of what it is to exist in his *Meditations*. Throughout his body of work, Descartes establishes the ability to think as a distinctively human capacity which comes with having a soul. There are, however, several difficulties in establishing both what Descartes means by thought (he refers to a range of capacities including doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, imagining, and even having sensory perceptions; AT VII 28, CSM II 28) and how this maps onto conscious awareness. If there are different ways of thinking, what distinguishes doubting (for instance) from understanding? Can thoughts be more or less conscious, or are all thoughts equally conscious?

I approach such questions through the particular case of infant and adult thought in Descartes. Such an approach comparison provides useful insights into the broader debate, as well as exposing puzzling elements of Descartes' account of thought. For Descartes, infants and adults both have souls, which bring with them the capacity to think. Nonetheless, Descartes implies that there is a substantial difference between infant and adult cognitive experience. He relates that infants and young children are 'immersed in the senses' (Principles 1.46, AT IXB 23, CSM 1 208; Letter for August 1641 AT 111 424, CSMK 189 190) that their judgements are less reliable than those of adults (Sixth Replies AT VII 437; CSM II, 294-5); that childhood judgements are the source of erroneous preconceived opinions (Sixth Replies, *ibid.*); and that infants are unable to experience any 'pure acts of understanding' (Letter for Arnauld 4 June 1648 AT V, 192; CSMK, 354).² Nonetheless, it is not obvious what to make of Descartes' various claims about the nature of infant thought. For one thing, while Descartes portrays infant cognition as inferior in these respects, he insists that ensouled infants are thinking from the womb (Letter for Arnauld AT III 423; CSMK 189). But if the soul brings with it the essential capacity for thought, what explains why infant thinking is inferior to adult thinking?

I will ultimately argue that Descartes presents a nuanced account of the difference between infant and adult and thought which rests on the notion of attention - rather than merely on the structure of thought itself. However, for Descartes, infants are unable to attend to and reflect upon their thoughts in the sophisticated ways possible for adults. In this respect, the infant intellect is less powerful than the adult intellect, whereas the adult power of intellect and degree of reason is what renders adult judgements more likely to be reliable.

Maks Sipowicz

Margaret Cavendish, the Cartesian Passions, and Health.

In the 'Epiloge to my Philosophical Opinions' of her *Philosophical and Physical Opinions* (1655) Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673) tells us she had read half of René Descartes' (1596-1650) 'book of passion'. Here, she is most likely referring to the 1650 English translation of his *Passions de l'âme*, the text that gives us the most complete statement of Descartes' theory of the passions. The Cartesian theory is unique for the seventeenth century, in that it shows not only the psychological effects of the passions, but also their physiological causes and effects. The book also stands as the most complete statement of Descartes' ideas about medicine published in his lifetime. Indeed, recent work by Dennis Des Chene (2000, 2012) and Annie Bitbol-Héspères (2000) shows that Descartes' ideas about the physiological side of the passions, and the way they impact our health, are crucial to understanding the full scope of his theory.

Cavendish does not give a clear statement of her theory of the passions in any single treatise, but she does engage with Descartes' *Passions* from the beginning of her publishing career, particularly in her *Poems, and Fancies* (1653) and *Philosophical Fancies* (1653). In this paper, I propose to look more closely at this engagement, to shed light on Cavendish's own theory of the passions. Liam Semler (2012) has done part of the work already by tracing the way in which Cavendish takes up Cartesian ideas in her early texts. Here, I propose to build on this work by demonstrating that the physiological side of Descartes' theory provides an essential backdrop to Cavendish's thought on the passions. I begin by bringing out Cavendish's theory of the passions, before looking to the way that both Descartes and Cavendish approach the impact that the passions have on our physical health. I argue that looking to this framework enhances our understanding of both Cavendish and Descartes in two important ways. First, the medical aspect of the passions is the most pronounced way in which Cavendish adopts Cartesian ideas about the passions into her own thought. Second, given that Cavendish remains a defender of the Galenic paradigm in medicine, her adoption of parts of the Cartesian framework of the passions show a previously underappreciated transformation of Cartesian philosophy.

Elena Gordon

Hume's Final Words on Final Causes: Re-Reading Philo's Objections to the Design Argument in the Dialogues

David Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* presents several interpretive ambiguities. The debate between the three characters of the *Dialogues* (Demea, Philo and Cleanthes) touches on several issues pertaining to natural religion. This paper will focus on the debate that transpires between Philo and Cleanthes on the status of the Design Argument and related interpretive quandaries that this debate raises for our understanding of Hume's other texts. Questions have been raised about the consistency of Philo's position because in Parts I through XI he rigorously contests the version of the Design Argument voiced by Cleanthes, arguing that there are several possible explanations for the prevalence of order and arrangement throughout the universe, and that intelligent design is not the best explanation for this prevalence. Then, in Part XII he seemingly 'reverses' this position and asserts that purposiveness, design and intention are so prevalent in the natural world that one would be foolish to reject outright the idea that intelligent design could be causally responsible for this prevalence. This apparent reversal raises two important and interrelated questions: First, is Philo's position internally inconsistent? Second, given that Philo is commonly taken to be Hume's spokesperson in the *Dialogues*, what, if anything, does this 'reversal' mean for interpretations of Hume's earlier views on the prevalence of adaptations of means to ends in the natural world?

Standard responses to this puzzle have suggested that Philo reversed his position for the sake of preserving his friendship with Cleanthes (Dees 2002), or that Hume reversed Philo's position for the sake of external considerations such as the text's reception (Kemp Smith 1935). Either way, scholars have tended not to think that Philo's supposed reversal is genuine, and therefore that the *Dialogues* do not raise serious concerns about our understanding of Hume's apparent resistance to teleology and talk of final causes. In this paper, I argue, by contrast, that careful attention to the details of the dispute between Philo and Cleanthes on the Design Argument reveals the primary points of contention to be: (i) whether or not the prevalence of the 'curious adapting of means to ends' (DNR 2.5, KS 143) throughout nature provides strong evidence for the view that intelligence is one of God's attributes; and (ii) whether or not analogical arguments strongly support the Design Argument. What is pointedly not debated is the fact of the pervasiveness of the adjustment of means to ends in animals and other organised bodies. Once one appreciates that this claim is not up for dispute, it becomes clear that Philo's arguments are not only internally consistent, but importantly contribute to an underappreciated strand of thought that Hume sustained throughout his philosophical writings. Drawing my evidence from the *Treatise* and the *First Enquiry*, I show that Hume, like Philo, supports the notion that animal and vegetable bodies are adjusted with the appropriate means to ends so as to render it possible for them to flourish and preserve themselves in their natural environments.

Dominic Dimech

The Relevance of Fictions for Hume's Epistemology

The topic of fictions represents a considerable niche area of scholarship in Hume studies. A number of commentators have had something to say about Hume's treatment of fictions in their readings of Hume's metaphysics, epistemology, and moral philosophy (for instance, Cottrell 2016, Loeb 2002, Norton & Norton 2000, Traiger 1987) and specialised debates continue to play out in philosophy journals over the topic. In this paper, I aim to fill a gap in the literature by addressing, in general, the significance an account of fictions could have for understanding Hume's philosophy.

As my starting point, I take the following points raised in Traiger's (1987) influential reading of Humean fictions to be correct. (1) Some, but by no means all, of Hume's usages of "fiction" in the *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40) are technical terms in Hume's theory of mind. (2) Other usages of "fiction" are plainer: Hume often uses fiction in contrast to belief, to signify a low level of the vivacity of an idea and/or a low level of credence, and he sometimes uses "fictitious" as a synonym for "false". (3) To attempt to artificially unify Hume's different usages of "fiction" is an unfruitful task.

More substantially, I articulate two new challenges that scholars working on an account of Humean fictions need to address. Firstly, I illustrate the problem that arises from the near total absence of the terms "fiction" and "fictitious" in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (first ed. 1748). The problem is not merely that this is one of Hume's major works, but that Hume himself says the *Enquiry* is supposed to summarise and improve the very philosophy of the *Treatise*. Should we be led to the conclusion that Hume thought his references to fictions were distracting and inessential? I suggest that there is no case for dismissing the relevance of fictions altogether, but that we ought not overstate the general epistemological implications of an account of Humean fictions. My argument, therefore, represents a major setback for the ambitious view expressed by Traiger (1987) that fictions are as central to Hume's philosophy as the impressions/ideas distinction.

The second problem I raise is that, even in the *Treatise*, Hume does not generally treat fictions as what I will call an 'organising principle' of his thought. By this, I mean that Hume generally does not set up his discussions by making reference to fictions nor does he usually intend to establish a conclusion about fictions. True, most of *Treatise* 1.2 involves arguing for conclusions about fictitious ideas, and so does Hume's brief section on substance at *Treatise* 1.1.6. But this is never true in *Treatise* 1.3 (in which Hume explicates his theory of causation) and almost never true in *Treatise* 1.4 (which is Hume's treatment of philosophical scepticism). I hold, then, that at least one key Humean topic can be understood perfectly independently of an account of fictions, namely, Hume's scepticism. I explicate some key Humean ideas from *Treatise* 1.4.7 and *Enquiry* 12 in support of this point, drawing on similarities between those two sections of text.

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Vili

Collins on Powers of Parts and Wholes, and Consciousness

I will discuss Anthony Collins' purported materialism in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. I will first textually argue for two starting points: a) Collins is committed to a Lockean distinction that power of thinking and actual (conscious) thinking are conceptually distinct from one another. Very briefly put, consciousness reveals us nothing about the nature of the subject it inheres in. b) Collins accepts from Clarke that consciousness is a unity; and because it is a unity, its subject must be unified too.

It is against this background that we should see that instead of attempting to account for how consciousness is, or could be, a property of a material subject, Collins attempts to make acceptable the more general idea that a sufficiently unified power, such as the power to think, could result from a joint contribution of parts of a material system. I will thus argue that the received view according to which, for Collins, "thinking and consciousness [are] emergent properties of the brain just as the property of being able to produce the smell of a rose is an emergent property of the particles that compose a rose"¹ is mistaken.

Collins is concerned with the relation between powers of parts of a system and a unified power of a system that results from a joint contribution of powers of the parts—not with emergent materialism specifically. Collins reads Clarke as maintaining that material systems cannot think because they lack suitable unity, which is what immaterial souls possess. Collins wants to show that there is an abundance of non-controversial instances in the nature where powers of parts of a system lack the power that the system as a whole exhibits, such as a rose's (unified) power to produce a smell.

As concerns the place of consciousness in Collins' view, he takes it to be conceptually distinct from the unified power of thinking that gives rise to it. As the power of thinking need not always be actualized, it is distinct from actual thinking, i.e., consciousness. Collins' (Lockean) separation of power of thinking from actual thinking has a two-fold motivation. (i) Conceptually the distinction is based on our limited access to natures of substances, on the one hand, and our direct access to consciousness, on the other. (ii) The distinction is of particular importance in understanding of what matters for the afterlife: the continuity of the experiential reality of our conscious lives.

We will then see that since Collins' motivation for the possibility of thinking matter derives from the conceptual distinction between consciousness and its subject (which subject, according to Clarke and several others, must be immaterial), Collins also does not think he is in a position to re-bridge that gap in materialist terms, for there is nothing to materiality that would facilitate making the connection between consciousness and its subject more intelligible than under the supposition that the subject is immaterial.

Jun Young Kim

A Combinatorial Theory of Compossibility in Leibniz's Metaphysics

Most contemporary metaphysicians think that for any two distinct things, it is always possible for them to coexist with one another. Leibniz gives a somewhat different answer: two distinct things are able to coexist with one another only when they are compossible. God cannot create all possible substances together because not all of them are compossible. But what is the basis within Leibniz's philosophy for the impossibility of substances? This has been one of the most hotly contested issues in the recent secondary literature. Four kinds of interpretations have been presented. Logical interpretations maintain that compossibility is ultimately nothing but logical consistency. Advocates of logical interpretations argue that two possible substances are compossible just in case their complete concepts are logically consistent. In contrast, lawful, cosmological, and packing interpretations assume that possible substances are logically independent of one another. They maintain that any two possible substances are per se compossible. However, God is precluded from actualizing all possible substances by some non-logical constraints.

The second literature has long been dominated by variations of those four approaches. In this presentation, however, I show that there is one important issue which has been largely overlooked: compossibility relation might be intransitive. Intransitivity will be problematic for all the above interpretations; for, despite their differences, they all agree that compossibility relation is transitive. According to logical interpretations, each possible substance is compossible with and only with its world-mates; thus, compossibility is an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetric, and transitive). According to lawful, cosmological, and packing interpretations, the compossibility relation is trivially transitive since any two possible substances are per se compossible. However, there are passages where Leibniz suggests that the compossibility relation is intransitive. If compossibility is intransitive for him, then none of those four approaches is on the right track. This indicates that we need a new approach to the puzzle of compossibility. In this paper I present a novel 2 interpretation of compossibility. My alternative has the following features: (1) It uses combinatorial principles to solve the problem of compossibility; God calculates all the possible combinations and the sum of the perfection of each combination by simple mathematical principles. But (2) the combinatorial principles I am relying on are non-Humean. Thus, I deny that everything can be combined with everything else. The intransitivity of compossibility is in fact a natural consequence of non-Humean combinatorialism. Most importantly, (3) my view can provide solutions to the important puzzles of compossibility. More specifically, it can explain both that (i) Spinozistic necessitarianism is logically impossible, and that (ii) the World-Apart scenario is logically possible for Leibniz

Jack Stetter

The First Refutation of Spinoza's Ethics in French: Dom François Lamy's *Le nouvel athéisme renversé* (1696)

It is a commonplace of traditional presentations of the history of seventeenth-century philosophy to state that Descartes' groundbreaking undertakings in various fields transformed philosophy and that he deserves the title of "Father" of Modern philosophy. Nonetheless, within less than half a century after Descartes' death, Cartesianism was perceivably on the defensive across the Continent. The historical and philosophical details of late-seventeenth-century Cartesians' efforts to stem the tide of further upheaval in philosophy remain understudied. In late-seventeenth-century France, for instance, the arrival of Spinoza's mature philosophy provided an opportunity to Cartesians in good standing with established political power to re-assert their Roman Catholic bona fides while simultaneously denouncing the putative excesses of Spinozism. The case of Dom François Lamy (1636-1711), a now largely forgotten Benedictine monk and Cartesian philosopher whose extensive relations with Arnauld, Bossuet, Fénelon, and Malebranche brought him into contact with the philosophical elite of late-seventeenth-century France, and who authored the first detailed and explicit refutation of Spinoza's Ethics in French, *Le nouvel athéisme renversé* (1696), sheds new light on this gradual cementing of Cartesian conservatism.

Unjustly neglected in literature on Spinoza and the evolution of seventeenth-century philosophy, several features of Lamy's text on Spinoza are interesting both historically and philosophically. For starters, Lamy's refutation of Spinoza's Ethics is itself written in the geometrical style of Euclid, and Lamy's discussion of the value of the geometrical method is telling. Additionally, the examination of Lamy's account of Spinoza's allegedly failed attempt to reconcile an account of the conceptual independence of attributes with his theory of substance monism at 1p10 and scholium, and Lamy's claim that Spinoza's philosophy amounts to question-begging by virtue of the Spinozist definition of God at 1d6, can enhance our understanding of what late-seventeenth-century Cartesians found most philosophically and/or religiously troublesome in Spinoza.

In this paper, I present Lamy's life and anti-Spinozist work and examine what they tell us about the complex state of Spinoza's reception in Cartesian circles in France in the 1680s and 1690s.

Ariel Alejandro Melamedoff

The Role of Inertia in Mary Shepherd's Causal Theory

In her 1824 *Essay Upon the Relation of Cause and Effect*, Mary Shepherd sets out to refute the Humean account of causation that had been gaining popularity in early 19th Century Scotland.¹ Her goal: to defend the reality of the causal relation, and claim that it is established by reason, and not imagination or convention. In doing so, she takes aim at Hume's claim that causes must be temporally prior to their effects. In fact, Shepherd takes this to be one of the crucial mistakes in Hume's causal theory. The view that causes precede their effects is what allows Hume to separate cause and effect in thought, thereby imagining the effect "held in suspense."²

Her own considered metaphysics of causation states that objects are individuated by their qualities, so that objects are created (and destroyed) in every instance in which there is a change in the arrangement of qualities.³ We call the interaction of existing objects 'cause' and the resultant object(s) 'effect.' Yet strictly speaking the interaction of existing objects, and the creation of new objects, both just consist in the change in qualities. Thus, on Shepherd's view, cause and effect must be simultaneous, because they are two descriptions of a single event: an event in which qualities change from being arranged in a particular way (the existing objects) to being arranged in a new way (the new objects).

Shepherd is not the first to reduce cause and effect to a simultaneous event. In fact, Hume himself argues against the possibility of simultaneous causation in the *Treatise*, claiming that allowing this possibility leads to the absurd conclusion that all objects exist contemporaneously, and that there is no succession of them over time.⁴ Hume's argument was partly aimed at those thinkers – like Aquinas and Hobbes – who had previously attempted to account for causation in terms of simultaneous causal events, rather than diachronic ones. In this paper, I argue that Shepherd does have a response to Hume's argument, one that differentiates hers from past attempts to claim all causes are simultaneous with their effects. In particular, Shepherd adopts a face-value interpretation of Newtonian mechanics, one in which an object's continued motion in a straight line – that is, its inertial motion – is a stable quality of that object. As a result, Shepherd does not need to explain what causes objects to continue moving once they are created as a result of (simultaneous) causal events. This, I argue, allows her a way out of Hume's objection. Hume's argument against simultaneous causation relies on the premise that all change, including change in an object's position over time, requires causal explanation. Through her appeal to Newtonian inertia, Shepherd is able to accept all of the other premises of Hume's argument – that all objects have a sufficient cause, that all objects are causally connected to each other, and that causal events are simultaneous⁵ – while still avoiding the absurd conclusion that all objects exist contemporaneously.

¹ Shepherd (1824).

² Ibid, 30.

³ For more detail, see Fantl (2014).

⁴ Hume, *Treatise* 1.3.2.7. My interpretation of this argument leans heavily on Ryan (2002)

⁵ As should be clear, Hume himself does not endorse these premises. His argument is rather attempting to demonstrate by his (broadly-Aristotelian) opponent's own lights that causes cannot be simultaneous with their effects

Allauren Forbes

Mary Wollstonecraft's Political Conception of Marriage: Friendship, Autonomy, and Property

Sometimes known as the mother of feminism, Mary Wollstonecraft has inspired much literature in feminist and political philosophy. ⁱ From her more straightforwardly political texts, most notably *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* and *A Vindication of the Rights of Men*, to her novellas *Mary, a Fiction* and *The Wrongs of Woman, or Maria*, the themes of marriage and friendship emerge as central to her philosophical and political thought. Her interest in marriage is hardly surprising given the ink spilled by feminists and anti-feminists alike on this institution throughout history. Her discussion of friendship, however, represents an interesting development in early modern philosophical work – specifically, the incorporation of Aristotelian character or virtue friendship for pro-women ends. ⁱⁱ The view that women were capable of engaging in a friendship requiring good character and equality was remarkable given the time, even if Wollstonecraft herself expressed doubt as to how many women would currently be capable of such a relation (e.g., VRW, 277).

Wollstonecraft's discussions of marriage and friendship are intimately tied to her view on freedom or autonomy. Though Wollstonecraft was responding to figures like Rousseau and Burke, she possessed a distinctive conception of autonomy. Wollstonecraft scholars such as Alan Coffee (2013, 2014, forthcoming) and Catriona Mackenzie (1993, 2016) have argued persuasively that Wollstonecraft viewed autonomy as broadly republican and relational. This, again, places Wollstonecraft at the forefront of her time, as while republican conceptions of freedom were fairly common, relational autonomy only entered formal philosophical discourse in the twentieth century. In this paper, I aim to blend Wollstonecraft's political criticisms of marriage with her view of autonomy in order to offer a more complete understanding of one of Wollstonecraft's central philosophical projects.

Specifically, I argue that Wollstonecraft's conception of marriage as friendship amounts to a multidimensional account of relational autonomy, and that this is politically significant particularly when it occurs within the context of the historically oppressive relation of marriage and the associated connotations of property. First, I show that marriage as friendship offers a quiet revision of a politically powerful institution insofar as it revises socio-structural power relations between men and women. Second, I argue that this distinction reveals how Wollstonecraft's criticism of the traditional model of marriage offers a pre-Marxist critique. Though Wollstonecraft precedes Marx, there are distinct similarities between her discussion of the standard model of marriage as commodifying, exploiting, and alienating women, as well as creating a false consciousness about women's nature, and how Marx criticized capitalism and related property conventions. I conclude by considering how our understanding of Wollstonecraft's political projects, including the nature of citizenship, ought to be informed by this pre-Marxist feature of her criticisms.

ⁱ See, e.g., Sandrine Bergès (2013), *The Routledge Guidebook to Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*; Sandrine Bergès and Alan Coffee, eds. (2016). *The Social and Political Philosophy of Mary Wollstonecraft*; Lena Halldenius (2007; 2013; 2015).

ⁱⁱ Some recent scholarship on Wollstonecraft makes this case explicitly. See Nancy Kendrick (2016); Elizabeth Frazer (2008); Ruth Abbey (1999); Catriona Mackenzie (1993).

Michael LeBuffe

Complex Individuals in Spinoza: The State and the Citizen

The analogy between citizens and states in Spinoza might be drawn too quickly: citizens have minds and seek their own interests; states have minds and seek their own interests; therefore, a state is like a citizen. While the analogy is accurate, it is also uninformative. Spinoza's metaphysics of finite things suggests that almost any finite cause at all is a thing (E2d7) with its own interest (E3p6) and that any such thing has a mind (E2p13s).

This essay describes in more detail the sort of thing that a human being is and builds on that basis a more specific and productive form of the analogy. On Spinoza's accounts of them, two properties distinguish human beings from other finite things. First, a human body is both an individual that has an interest and also a thing composed of individuals each of which also has its own interest. (See the definitions of 'singular thing' and 'individual', Post. 1 of the physical discursus following E2p13s, and E3p6-9.) Second (drawing in addition upon E3p9s, accounts of value and the affects, and E4p43) human beings survive changes to the power of their parts that are at the same time different changes to the power of the whole. For example, a change that makes a part of a human being less powerful may make the whole person more powerful. Because Spinoza associates power and interest, these points imply that what is good or bad for a part of the human body may not have the same value for the whole.

Spinoza's political writings, particularly the Political Treatise, suggest that the state shares these distinctive features of the human body. The clearest evidence for this conclusion may be found in Spinoza's discussion of the Ottoman Empire (TP 6.4). At the time of the composition of the TP, the Ottoman Empire—at the fullest extent of its range and 300 years old—was the best example of a powerful and persevering state. Spinoza recognizes its power, but he also regards its citizens as slaves, the weakest of human beings. His discussion suggests that continuous weakening of the citizens has continually strengthened the state.

The analogy, so put, yields insight into Spinoza's humanism. If the interests of parts are distinct from and may conflict with those of the whole, which should we prioritize? From an abstract, metaphysical perspective, Spinoza's answer may seem puzzling: in ethics, prefer the whole; in politics, the part. Putting names to these abstractions makes Spinoza's position clearer. Spinoza contends in the Ethics (E4p37) that virtuous people prefer our good to that of things different in nature from us, regardless of the context. Supposing that this proposition amounts to guidance for all of us, it suggests that, in thinking about ourselves, we should prefer our own good to that of our parts, but also that, in thinking about states, we should prefer our own good to that of which we are a whole.

Olga Lenczewska

From Rationality to Morality: the Collective Development of Practical Reason in Kant's Anthropological Writings

Kant's anthropological essays "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim" and "Conjectural Beginning of Human History", which display Kant's engagement with the genre of 'conjectural history', offer an account of the transition between the initial and mature uses of practical reason, and thus an account of our species' development into humans proper, i.e., into beings who not only possess the faculty of reason, but can make full or mature use of it. Kant's anthropological or empirical ethics complements his better known transcendental ethics in many interesting ways (by, for instance, explaining the tight relation between our existence as a part of nature and our existence as independent of nature). The aim of my paper is to analyze Kant's anthropological account of the development of practical reason in order to explain how pragmatic anthropology prepares the way for his transcendental ethics.

Specifically, my paper focuses on Kant's conjectural account of the way in which humans learned to make practical use of their reason in a developed (mature) way, which is characterized by the ability to exercise the psychological disposition that Kant labels pluralism in his "Anthropology": the standpoint of assuming my coexistence in a community with others and of regarding myself as governed by the universal, unanimously agreed upon law which governs the pursuit of everyone's happiness (7:130). I show that in the light of Kant's "Universal History" and "Conjectural Beginning", our attainment of the status of moral agents – agents who are governed by the moral law and adopt a pluralistic standpoint of reason – is the final stage of a process of the collective development of our species' social and rational capacities. Moreover, I show that Kant's early anthropological writings suggest that although humans entered the condition of sociality for self-interested reasons, the reasons for socio-political co-existence changed from egoistic (self-interested) to altruistic (moral) alongside the gradual development of practical reason. I conclude my paper by discussing the process of gradual moralization or the development of a virtuous character, which takes place after we have achieved the capacity to adopt the pluralistic standpoint of practical reason

Sukjae Lee

Leibniz on Formal Causation

Given the central role causal realism plays within Leibniz's mature metaphysics, the continual interest within the secondary literature on how to understand Leibniz on this issue comes as no surprise. As he famously states in "On Nature Itself," "the very substance of things consists in a force for acting and being acted upon." (AG 159) Any successful reading of Leibniz's metaphysics requires that we get a firm and accurate grasp of what creaturely forces are for the mature Leibniz.

The issue of whether these forces are to be thought as fundamentally productive or efficient causes has received a fair bit of attention in the secondary literature. But other closely related issues, such as the nature of appetitive forces, have not received the attention they deserve, and another such topic appears to be that of formal causation, a deficit that this paper hopes to play a part in remedying.

Readers are familiar with Leibniz's statement concerning the rehabilitation of the antiquated notion of substantial forms as a cornerstone of his mature metaphysics in the Discourse of Metaphysics. But we are also well aware that such rehabilitations are typically executed on Leibniz's own terms, implying that what gets through the "rehabilitation process," as it were, might not be what the original proponents of the notion would have anticipated. Central to Leibnizian creaturely activity are the "primitive forces" that are causally responsible for the successive series of states of any given substance, which according to Leibniz are "as it were, the law of the series [of successive states of an enduring thing]. (G II,262). This identification of force with the law of the series itself strikes us as somewhat odd, since it seems to be one thing to say that a force causally produces its relevant effects in accordance with a law and quite another to say that the force literally is the law. While the oddity can be resolved if we simply take Leibniz to be holding the former view, but there are additional, important texts, beginning from fairly early on in Leibniz's career, that incline us to consider seriously the latter, more literal reading as well.

In this paper, I hope to pursue the prospect of understanding Leibnizian force or form as the law of the series of the creature in question with the goal of getting a better sense of Leibnizian formal causation in general. To be more specific, I hope to focus on three themes that emerge in Leibniz's discussion of formal causation: (1) the close connection he makes between "reason" and "cause" in his account of intra-monadic change; (2) his discussion of how "perception is the operation proper to the soul" (G II, 372), and how the series of perceptual states stand in certain logical and conceptual relations mirrored in the complete individual concept of an individual; (3) the possibility of reading of his criticism of occasionalism ("On Nature Itself") as the criticism of the view that lacks the proper conceptual and logical relations between creaturely states, and what implications this deficiency has. In pursuing these themes, I hope to evaluate the robustness and distinctiveness of Leibnizian formal causation, in part by making clearer how his conception of formal causation diverges from the traditional understanding of formal and efficient causation typically attributed to substantial forms within the late Scholastic Aristotelian tradition.

Ville Paukkonen

COLLINS ON POWERS OF PARTS AND WHOLE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS

I will discuss Anthony Collins' purported materialism in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. I will first textually argue for two starting points: a) Collins is committed to a Lockean distinction that power of thinking and actual (conscious) thinking are conceptually distinct from one another. Very briefly put, consciousness reveals us nothing about the nature of the subject it inheres in. b) Collins accepts from Clarke that consciousness is a unity; and because it is a unity, its subject must be unified too.

It is against this background that we should see that instead of attempting to account for how consciousness is, or could be, a property of a material subject, Collins attempts to make acceptable the more general idea that a sufficiently unified power, such as the power to think, could result from a joint contribution of parts of a material system. I will thus argue that the received view according to which, for Collins, "thinking and consciousness [are] emergent properties of the brain just as the property of being able to produce the smell of a rose is an emergent property of the particles that compose a rose"¹ is mistaken.

Collins is concerned with the relation between powers of parts of a system and a unified power of a system that results from a joint contribution of powers of the parts—not with emergent materialism specifically. Collins reads Clarke as maintaining that material systems cannot think because they lack suitable unity, which is what immaterial souls possess. Collins wants to show that there is an abundance of non-controversial instances in the nature where powers of parts of a system lack the power that the system as a whole exhibits, such as a rose's (unified) power to produce a smell.

As concerns the place of consciousness in Collins' view, he takes it to be conceptually distinct from the unified power of thinking that gives rise to it. As the power of thinking need not always be actualized, it is distinct from actual thinking, i.e., consciousness. Collins' (Lockean) separation of power of thinking from actual thinking has a two-fold motivation. (i) Conceptually the distinction is based on our limited access to natures of substances, on the one hand, and our direct access to consciousness, on the other. (ii) The distinction is of particular importance in understanding of what matters for the afterlife: the continuity of the experiential reality of our conscious lives.

We will then see that since Collins' motivation for the possibility of thinking matter derives from the conceptual distinction between consciousness and its subject (which subject, according to Clarke and several others, must be immaterial), Collins also does not think he is in a position to re-bridge that gap in materialist terms, for there is nothing to materiality that would facilitate making the connection between consciousness and its subject more intelligible than under the supposition that the subject is immaterial.

¹ William Uzgalis, "Anthony Collins on the Emergence of Consciousness and Personal Identity", *Philosophy Compass*, 4/2 (2009): 363–379; 367.

Jacob Zellmer

Spinoza on the Separation of Philosophy and Theology

A central argument of Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise (1670) is that each individual in a society can be granted the freedom to philosophize without harm to individual and collective religious faith. To help argue for this, Spinoza completely separates philosophy and theology – the domain of philosophy is truth, whereas the domain of theology is the cultivation of obedience with almost no regard for whether its doctrines are true (call this the Separation Theory). Yet, interpreters of Spinoza have found problems in this account. Daniel Garber argues that a problem for Spinoza's Separation Theory is that Spinoza gives philosophical reasoning the ability to defeat theological beliefs. How are philosophy and theology separate if one can undermine the other? I argue for a solution to Garber's problem that reads Spinoza as making a distinction between goals and domains. This distinction allows us to bypass Garber's problem by showing that the domains of philosophy and theology are separate even though the goals of philosophy and theology may overlap or conflict. The upshot of my reading is that Spinoza's account allows for the possibility that rational thinking might undermine theological doctrines, but his account of a narrow domain of theology safeguards the core tenet of theology, namely, that obedience can lead to blessedness, from philosophical scrutiny.

Thomas Corbin

From Aristotle into Hobbes: What Hobbes' translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* shows us

Published in 1637, *A Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique* was released under the initials T.H. and has been reliably attributed to Thomas Hobbes. Originally a study aid for his student William Cavendish (1617 – 1684), the work was the first English translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* ever to be published. Although mostly true to the original, albeit in condensed form, the *Briefe* does contain significant departures. These departures, however, have never been explored in depth within the literature on Hobbes' thought.

This paper presents key findings from a comparative study on the *Briefe*. This study first compares Hobbes' translation to the original work in order to uncover what the actual similarities and departures are. This study also, particularly from the perspective of these similarities and departures, compares this translation to Hobbes' own later, more famous, works. By doing so, as this paper shows, we can not only see the kernel of what is to become Hobbes' philosophy, but we can also gain a better, more accurate, picture of what that philosophy actually looks like to Hobbes himself.

In Hobbes' *Briefe* he translates Aristotle's discussion of many political concepts and themes which will go on to be the cornerstones of his later philosophy. For example, Hobbes translates Aristotle's discussions on sovereignty, on justice, on equity, and on the purpose of the commonwealth. In each of these areas, Hobbes makes significant departures from the original. Exploring exactly what these departures are, and how they compare to the later more familiar renditions we find in Hobbes' philosophy, gives us a far more accurate picture of the way in which Hobbes himself saw these central concepts. Exploring this also gives us a better picture of how Hobbes' thought transformed over time to become one of the most important in early modern political thought.

Hobbes' philosophy clearly transformed the standard ways of thinking of the period, and indeed it has continued to do so. As a result, his philosophy has been thoroughly studied ever since. How Hobbes' own thought transformed into this philosophy, however, is far harder to study and has consequently received significantly less attention. By observing Hobbes' thought in this earlier work, we find a method that allows us to observe this more elusive transformation taking place.

Sandrine Berges

From Rousseau to Laura Ingalls Wilder: The ascension of women to the power of domesticity in 18th century France and America.

When the question of women's vote and political participation was raised most vehemently in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, some women refused to participate on the grounds that women's power was better used in the home, keeping everybody safe, alive, and virtuous. And when women did get the vote, these objectors availed themselves of the opportunity, seeing it as a duty, rather than a right: they had to make sure that the wiser rule they exercised from home was not compromised by the vote of the 'rougher' women voters. Laura Ingalls Wilder, the famous children author, was one of these women:

"It is easy to forecast the effect of woman suffrage on politics if the home-loving, home-keeping women should refuse to use their voting privilege, for the *rougher class of women* will have no hesitancy in going to the polling places and casting their ballots."

This attitude seems to us very conservative, preventing women from accessing the political power and influence that is their right, as much as it is men's. In this paper I want to argue that this attitude has its roots in the republican thought of the eighteenth century in America, and in France. I will show how the status of women before the two revolutions did not allow even for power exercised in the home, and how the advent of republican ideals in France and America offered women non-negligible power despite their not having a right to vote.

I will begin with Rousseau's dual (and perhaps ambivalent) stand on women's place. On the one hand, he denies them any real power by saying that their power is over men, and exercised through the promise (and withdrawal) of sex. On the other hand, his placing the republican woman at the center of the home, making her indispensable for the wellbeing, physical and moral, of the family, gives women a source of power they lacked before. The flourishing of the republic – in France as in America – depends on the virtue of its citizens. And the source of this virtue is the in the hands of the wife and mother. This part of Rousseau's thought explains why so many of the women who read him in the second half of the eighteenth century fell 'half in love' with him.

In the main part of the paper I will show how four of Rousseau's readers, Mary Wollstonecraft, Olympe de Gouges, Manon Roland and Hannah Mather Crocker adapted Rousseau's views on the place of women in the home to defend their own form of (proto-) feminism. I will argue that for these women, to a large extent, and in different ways, real domestic power was also political power. I will argue that virtue was central in the republican arguments they weaved, and that this meant that power and influence were derived as much from social position than a political one. While there are very obvious (to us) objections to this position, it nonetheless marked a progress in women's position.

João Carvalho

Spinoza on teleology and the free man

Prima facie, Spinoza seems committed to a surprising assertion:

(1) The free man is the ethical goal we ought to achieve

This claim is particularly puzzling within Spinoza's moral philosophy because he is also committed to other claims that are jointly incompatible with it. Consider, for the sake of the argument, the following statements:

(2) The free man is one who acts only from adequate ideas

(3) To act only from adequate ideas is impossible

Apply a transitive law to the set of equivalences in propositions (2)-(3), (4) follows:

(4) The free man is impossible Replace the equivalents in (1) and (4) and we are left with a troubling claim:

(5) The ethical goal we ought to achieve is impossible (i.e. an unachievable goal)

This paper is an attempt to clarify the nature of this puzzle; to assess the consistency of each claim against the metaphysical backdrop of the Ethics; and to defend a more productive and coherent reading of the free person, compatible with those commitments.

What's puzzling about this set of claims is that accepting premises (2)-(3) entails that the free man is an unrealizable ideal. In turn, this generates the troubling conclusion that Spinoza appears to concede that a certain ideal can constitute a legitimate normative demand, while maintaining that it is impossible to meet this demand. In other words, the problem is that we ought to achieve an ideal that cannot be achieved. This tension amounts to a contradiction if we accept that Spinoza's moral philosophy is committed to some version of the view that one can do what one ought to do. And, to further complicate this puzzle, even his endorsement of such an evident principle is disputed in the literature on the topic (Youpa 2010; Kisner 2011).

I argue that the puzzle should be resolved by rejecting the idea that the free person represents an ethical goal (pace Nadler, forthcoming). Spinoza rejects and, given his other commitments in the Ethics, ought to reject (1). The two commitments that are specially relevant for this purpose are his rejection of final causation and his endorsement of naturalism.

In rejecting final causation, Spinoza also rejects the idea that the sort of guidance that morality provides is to be understood through specifiable ends. Naturalism reaffirms this doctrine for human agents, ruling out any reference to goals that our activities ought to realise. Thus, propositions that express requirements on how a human being ought to be lack any basis in nature. The notion of the free person then does not encompass a set of normative demands or action-guiding principles.

In a conclusion, I assess the extent to which the free man, given Spinoza's metaphysics of finite things, can serve an important function. It is a means for understanding ourselves: we can only understand the extent to which we are free by comparing our condition to a perfectly free life, and this is what the model represents.

Sandra Field

The writings of Thomas Hobbes transformed the standard ways of understanding politics in the early modern period. Many thinkers in his time understood the normative form of political society to be a 'mixed constitution': in such a constitution, a stable and just political order is brought about by balancing the power of various elements of the polity against each other. Hobbes vehemently rejects this standard view, proposing instead that the normative form of politics is a unitary constitution under an absolute sovereign. In my paper, I explore a dilemma of social ontology which arises in Hobbes's defence of unitary absolute sovereignty. The dilemma was originally posed by his contemporary critics, and has recently been resurrected by Kinch Hoekstra. Hobbes famously conceived all forms of sovereignty as popular. On his view, sovereignty is constructed by the unification of the many individual wills of subjects within a commonwealth. This allows him to defend all forms of sovereignty, whether democratic, aristocratic, or monarchical, as equally enacting the will of the people. But this argument appears to undermine his criticism of mixed constitutionalists. If it is possible to combine multiple wills of individual subjects into sovereignty, why could it not equally be possible to combine the wills of the various political bodies of a mixed constitution? The puzzle of social ontology, posed sharply by Hoekstra, is how the two cases are relevantly different; Hoekstra takes Hobbes to be simply inconsistent.¹ To the contrary, by drawing attention to the structures of the concrete power (*potentia*) of the sovereign generated in the respective cases, I will offer a principled account of the varying possibility of constituting a single political will out of diverse human and institutional elements. My paper would fall under panel theme 3: State and Secularism.

Tsuyoshi Matsuda

Leibniz's relationalism of actual time

Leibnizian view on time is generally featured as “relationalism” in contrast to Newtonian “absolute time” in his correspondence with Clark. However we can go one step further to explore an ontological depth of this relationalism of time by focusing on the conception of “temp effectif” or “actual time.” By explicating the context of his remark of § 27 of 5th letter to Clark in 1715, Leibnizian ontology of actual time can be first of all confirmed as an application of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, for Leibniz in order to uncover the “ideality” of Newtonian “absolute time” that indifferently and monotonously flows independently from every individual events, in addition to its “reversible” character as a parameter of movements of bodies within frameworks of classical physics. Thereby the qualitatively individual character of actual time is elicited (cf. Matsuda.2016a).

The second issue is about “instant” and “tense” in the relationalism of actual time. In his correspondence with Bourguet in 1715 (GP III.581ff), Leibniz makes a distinction between two types of relationships of “instants” for escaping from “labyrinth of the composition of the continuum.” The one of them is the dependency relationship of later instants on earlier ones, as it is expressed in the phrase; “every present state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding states, so its present pregnant with the future” in *Monadology* §22. Actual time as instant has qualitative differences one after another in opposition to ideal or mathematical relationships of “instants” as geometrical points, besides unsymmetrical and transitive order.

From the context of rebuttal to “eternal return” in *Apocatastase pantiōn* in 1715 (Leibniz.1991. 74) and *Theodicy* §211, we argue finally for both “biological” and axiological aspects of relationalism of actual time in its depth, by dealing with his original interpretation of a passage of *de Arte poetica* of Horatius about “Zitherist who repeated errors in the same part”: actual time with constantly and qualitatively differentiating features cannot be equated with the possible order of succession as counterpart of the order of simultaneity, because every change of every monad are, metaphysically speaking with Leibniz, predetermined in “περιχώρησις” or interdependence of things of the Universe (Matsuda.2017). Therefore the series of instants must be seen as unfolding process of the perfection or optimization of monad as “entelechy” that is realized not only in the history of mankind, but also in the “evolution” of living things (Matsuda.2016b) despite twists and turns.

References : Leibniz. G.W., 1991. *De l'horizon de la doctrine humaine* (1693) ; *Apocatastase pantiōn* (*La Restitution universelle*) (1715) textes inédits, traduits et annotés par Michel Fichant.Paris.

Matsuda. T., 2016a. “The actual time in later Leibniz” *Vorträge des X.Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses*. ed. W. Li. et al., Olms. III. 441-455.

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Shohei Edamura

Inertia, Science, and Substantial Forms in Leibniz's Early Metaphysics

In *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Leibniz explained a drastic change of his view. According to his account although he once held the thoroughgoing mechanism that body consists in its shape, size and spatial motion, he started to accept that bodies have substantial forms that constantly endure and act:

[P]erhaps I will not be condemned [for restoring substantial forms] so easily when it is known that I have long meditated upon the modern philosophy, that I have given much time to experiments in physics and demonstrations in geometry, and that I had long been persuaded about the futility of these beings, which I finally was required to embrace in spite of myself and, as it were, by force, after having myself carried out certain studies. (DM 11 = AG 43)

What did Leibniz mean by “certain studies”? Leibniz addressed several distinct topics after the quoted passage. There are metaphysical discussions to demonstrate that extension alone cannot constitute the substance of body, that an individual notion includes everything that will happen to the individual, and that every individual substance expresses the whole universe. And Leibniz argued for the distinction between the momentum and the quantity of force. Moreover, Leibniz discussed the law of nature that larger bodies resist motions of other bodies more strongly than smaller ones. Among these topics, commentators took the distinction between the momentum and the quantity of force, as well as the conservation law concerning the quantity of force, to be Leibniz's strong motivation for adopting substantial forms.

However, the last item, namely the law of nature concerning the resistance of bodies, is quite important for understanding Leibniz's metaphysics. Thus I shall argue that Leibniz's understanding of passive force, presumably influenced by Kepler, is a primary motive to restore substantial forms. In the first section of my presentation, I will demonstrate that Leibniz postulated substantial forms to explicate how body continues to move despite that it has natural inertia. As Kepler did, and Newton didn't, Leibniz thought that the motion of a body is gradually weakened by its inertia. Thus he thought that if a body keeps the same speed, a continuous action must be postulated.

I also argue that Leibniz held that God's providence requires him to provide immanent active forces to bodies so that he can manage the universe of bodies in the most efficient way. Although Leibniz did not explicitly mention Malebranche in the early works, Leibniz substantially rejected Malebranche's theory that bodies do not have active forces and God directly moves bodies every moment.

And finally, I introduce another and more important argument based on Leibniz's understanding of science. Leibniz thought that science needs to explain phenomena in terms of the nature of a finite thing. This lets us see why Leibniz thought that bodies must have intrinsic active forces insofar as any other explanation cannot elaborate phenomena by means of the nature of body.

Marco Storni

Du Chatelet on Newtonian Attraction

In this paper, I intend to analyse Emilie Du Chatelet's interpretation of Newtonian attraction. This I shall do relying on two texts of hers: the review of Voltaire's *Éléments de la philosophie de Newton* (1738), published in September 1738 on the *Journal des savants*, and chapter 16 ("De l'attraction newtonienne") of the *Institutions de physique* (1740).

In the 1738 review, Du Chatelet sticks up for Newtonian physics, arguing against a set of classical neo-Cartesian claims. To reproduce the complexity of the debate, alongside the presentation of Voltaire's and Du Chatelet's arguments, I shall consider the position of a critic of the Newtonian tradition, namely the Jesuit Noel Regnault (1683-1762), who wrote a polemical review of the *Éléments* immediately after its publication (*Lettre d'un physicien sur la philosophie de Newton mise à la portée de tout le monde par M. de Voltaire*).

The analysis of Regnault's text shall also help to understand why, although Du Chatelet's ideas on Newton's physics change significantly after 1738, and become much more critical, her position still differs from that of the neo-Cartesians. In the second part of the paper, I shall indeed concentrate on Du Chatelet's *Institutions de physique* (1740), where, if the physics addressed is of an essentially Newtonian character, the metaphysical apparatus is certainly not, let alone the overall architecture of the text – reason why Newton, and particularly the concept of Newtonian attraction, is fiercely criticized.

My analysis will yield a picture of Du Chatelet as an acute critical interpreter of Newtonian natural philosophy, of which she has an in-depth knowledge, and of which she retains the main scientific results, while criticizing its metaphysical framework. This she does without falling back into a Cartesian approach, which she considers scientifically weak; she rather reworks the heritage of Leibniz and Wolff with the aim of providing a unitary, coherent, and scientifically up-to-date, picture of physical reality.

Lisa Shapiro

The Challenges of Being a Thinking Thing

What is it to be a thinking thing? Is it simply to be conscious, aware of our thoughts? Or is it something more? In this talk I draw upon Descartes and his near contemporaries to explore the question of what it is to think and to become a thinking thing. I argue, first, that Cartesian thinking involves essentially owning one's thoughts, where this ownership is an achievement – the result of an active norm-governed process. However, if thinking is, in this sense, an achievement, it is an ability that we develop. How is it that we develop into thinking things?

In 1686 Françoise d'Aubigné, Madame de Maintenon, opened a school at Saint-Cyr, just outside of Versailles, for impoverished aristocratic girls, (usually daughters of deceased military officers) with 250 students. The school itself is fascinating, offering a developmental curriculum in reading, writing, arithmetic, and religion, and introduced history, Latin and painting for older girls. There were four colour coded classes – reds (ages 7-11), greens (ages 11-14), yellows (ages 14-17), and blues (ages 17-20), and a professional lay teaching corps (the Dames Saint Louis), who were instructed in a pedagogy focused on dialogue or conversation, and who worked with apprentices – drawn from among the older students – who would review material and guide smaller groups in discussion. The school thrived as the leading European school for girls until it closed in 1793 by order of the revolutionary government, and it is historically interesting as a founding institution of lay education of girls and young women. It is also philosophically interesting insofar as the whole enterprise was structured on providing reasons, that is, teaching girls to become thinking things. Considering the structural features of the education at Saint-Cyr invites questions about the core of a Cartesian thinking thing.

Both the form and the content of the curriculum -- the dialogues that the serve as its foundation, as well as the addresses of Madame de Maintenon to the students, and to the faculty – suggests that learning to reason is a matter of practice: providing examples for students, having the students imitate those examples, and presumably encouraging them to give reasons for themselves. Recognizing that reason-giving involves practice raises a question of how to distinguish autonomous reason-giving, or the ownership of thought, from habituation or automatic trained responses. Equally, this practice in reason-giving at Saint-Cyr was informed by a very clear set of social norms that served a conservative political end. In particular, students were both alerted to the challenges of a woman's place in society, and yet seem to be encouraged not to resist those places but rather to develop the resources to survive the challenges. Maintenon's educational institution thus brings out how reason-giving practices are not independent of social mores, and so raises a question about the degree to which the reasons themselves have validity.

Nicholas Currie

The Early Modern Logic of Representations

In this paper, I will unpack a distinctive conception of logic pervasive in the early modern era, a conception of logic which preceding scholars have tended to refer to as the ‘logic of ideas’, the ‘logic of concepts’, or even ‘facultive logic’, but which I label the logic of representations (LoR).¹ First of all, in §1 I will set out a general, schematic outline of what LoRs looks like based on elements common to Arnauld’s Port-Royal, Locke’s Essay, Leibniz’s logical corpus, and the Wolffian logics of Wolff and Baumgarten. The picture that will emerge is of a core theory divided into three branches, mirroring the basic structure of term logics, albeit with the substitution of non-epistemic/psychological notions like term and proposition for epistemic/psychological alternatives.² Branch 1 will be seen to concern the ordering of a set or subset, *S*, of the basic intentional, representational mental items (i.e. usually called either “ideas”, or “concepts”) in terms of an inclusion, or “containment”, relation. This ordering will then be seen to have significant consequences for both (i) the truth conditions of more complex representational mental items – usually called “judgements” – in branch 2, and for (ii) logical implication between judgements in branch 3. More specifically, I will argue that the move to branches 2 and 3 is a consequence of an assumed order-isomorphism which holds between (i) the mind-dependent inclusion relation on the set of basic representations as studied in Part 1, and (ii) the mind-independent implication relation between a set of semantically defined predicates on *S*, *P*(*S*). In §2 I will argue that in spite of their suffusion with informal epistemological and metaphysical commitments, LoRs can nonetheless still be meaningfully called logics. More specifically, I will urge that in so far as they seek to provide an explanation of logical implication, they constitute general theories about the basis of human logical capacities. Finally, in §3 I will argue that the basic structure of LoRs is open to variant interpretations with radically different philosophical consequences. I identify two main species of interpretation, one which is essentially Cartesian and another which is essentially Lockean. The Cartesian reading seeks to explain the order-isomorphism between mind-dependent conceptual inclusion and mind-independent predicate implication in terms of God. The Lockean reading instead seeks to explain it in terms of the triangulation of the former in terms of the latter by means of experience.

¹ The term ‘logic of ideas’ was originally coined by Yolton (1955), but also features prominently in Schuurman (2001), (2004), and (2005). The term ‘logic of concepts’ appears frequently in both Anderson (2005) and (2015), and as ‘Logik der Begriffe’ in Prien (2006). The term ‘facultive logic’ is due to Buickerwood (1985).

² A fourth branch on ‘method’ is invariably also included but not of importance to the theory of implication in terms of containment at the heart of LoRs.

Adwait A. Parker

Cartesian Substance in the Context of Realist Copernicanism

A surprisingly lesser-studied aspect of Descartes' metaphysics of substance is its connection to his realist natural philosophy.¹ Scholars today are increasingly interested² in finding grounds for Descartes to assert that ordinary manifest material bodies (like stones and clothing)³ are substances. The challenge is to find some quantity or attribute or principle of individuation associated with material substance that remains conserved even while material substance loses parts. This challenge has not been approached from the perspective of Descartes' realist Copernicanism.

In particular, one unexplored avenue are material substances intermediate to ordinary manifest substances and metaphysically ultimate substances, namely, the planets. They are phenomenal deliverances but also theoretical constructs, defined in the Cartesian vortex theory by their volume-to-surface area ratio, which determines their orbital distance from a central body.⁴ John Schuster's work has indicated Descartes' turn to realist Copernicanism involved reflection on volume-to-surface area ratio as an explanatory tool in corpuscular-mechanism.⁵

Building on his work, I show how conservation of volume-to-surface area ratio provides a way to call planets substances, but only if we make a surprising move in re-interpreting Descartes' notion of 'determination to motion,' or principal directional tendency to motion. Puzzling to Hobbes and many others since, 'determination' is commonly held to be a mode of a mode (a privileged direction of a speed).⁶ But in static equilibrium, the model for Descartes' theory, a body acquires directional magnitude in relation to the whole system of bodies. I argue from these considerations to treat determination as a shared mode, much as the boundary between two bodies is a shared mode (which Descartes uses to explain the Eucharistic mystery).

¹However, see: Des Chene, Dennis, 1996. *Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

²Schmaltz, Tad M. 2018. 'Descartes on the Metaphysics of the Material World,' *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 127, 1-40; Schechtman, Anat. 2016. 'Substance and Independence in Descartes.' *Philosophical Review* Vol. 125, 155–204; Brown, Deborah, and Calvin Normore. Forthcoming. *Descartes' Ontology of Everyday Life*.

³Meditation III: "a stone is a substance, or is a thing that is apt to exist per se [quae per se apta est existere]" (AT 7:44); clothing is given as an example in Replies to Objections VI (AT 7:441) and in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet (AT 8-2:351).

⁴Schuster, John, 2005. 'Waterworld': Descartes' Vortical Celestial Mechanics. in Anstey & Schuster: *Science of Nature in the 17th Century*. Springer.

⁵Ibid, esp §7. See also Schuster 2013, *Descartes-Agonistes*, Springer, esp. chs 4 & 8. 6Sabra, A. I., 1967, *Theories of Light from Descartes to Newton*. London: Oldbourne, pp 118-121; Gabbey, Alan, 1980 'Force and Inertia in the seventeenth century: Descartes and Newton' in *Descartes: Philosophy, mathematics and physics*, ed. S. Gaukroger, pp 230-320. Sussex: Harvester; Knudsen and Pedersen, 1968, 'The link between "Determination" and conservation of motion in Descartes' dynamics. *Centaurus* 13: 183-186; Prendergast, TL,

1975. 'Motion, action and tendency in Descartes' physics', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 13: 453-462; McLaughlin, P 2000, 'Force determination and impact' in *Descartes' Natural Philosophy*, ed. S. Gaukroger, J.A. Schuster, and J. Sutton, 81-112. London: Routledge.

Jan Levin Propach

Why God Thinks what He is Thinking? — An Argument for Grounding Divine Ideas in Divine Perfections within Leibniz's Metaphysics.

In "Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility" (Newlands, Samuel, *Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility*, in: *Philosophical Review* 122 (2013), pp. 155–187) Samuel Newlands claims that, in Leibniz, ideas are mere brute facts in the divine intellect, when he writes that "God has a primitively rich intellect" (p. 170) and he argues against the assumption "that the content of God's basic ideas is wholly given to God's mind by God's simple, extramental perfections" (p. 170). I will argue, that Newlands' thesis cannot be justified in a Leibnizian setting. As a paradigmatic representative of early modern rationalism, the most fundamental principle for Leibniz is the Principle of Sufficient Reason. And obviously there is no sufficient reason why God thinks the ideas he thinks, if all ideas are brute facts. So I will argue that the reason for what God thinks is the divine nature. One of the main arguments (cf. p. 180) of Newlands against this thesis is as follows:

(1) If the reason for what God thinks is his own nature, there would not exist any divine ideas of imperfections.

(2) But obviously there are divine ideas of imperfections like ideas of bodies or pain.

(3) So, God's nature cannot be the reason for what God thinks about, because God's nature does not entail any imperfection. [by modus tollens on (1) and (2)]

(1) seems to me to be wrong. Indeed, for Leibniz as a representative of perfect-being-theology, God's nature entails an infinite number of perfections (cf. GP VII, p. 261). Newlands himself speaks about Leibniz' "combinatorial account of modality" (p. 167), so I will argue, that for Leibniz, in accordance with the tradition since St. Augustin, ideas of imperfections are negations of ideas of perfections. So, an idea of an imperfection is not a simple idea, but a complex, namely a negated positive simple idea of a perfection which is the result of a combination of negations and ideas of perfections (cf. A 6.4, p. 19). God thinks ideas of imperfections only mediately, by negating ideas of perfections. Even though the reason for what God thinks is his own nature, consisting of an infinite number of perfections, nevertheless there exist ideas of imperfections in the divine intellect. So (1) seems to be wrong.

Julie Klein

The Ambivalent Politics of Religion in Hobbes and Spinoza

At the end of *Leviathan* Chapter XI, Hobbes points to ignorance and fear as causes of religion and superstition. People ignorant of the causal structure of nature “stand in awe of their own imaginations,” “making the creatures of their own fancy their gods”; given the diversity of human fancy, “men have created innumerable sorts of gods.” “Religion” names our gods and practices; “superstition” the gods and practices of other people. *Leviathan* XII refines the argument with detailed attention to exactly how the combination of ignorance and the imperatives of self-preservation produces the “seeds of religion” and makes religion a powerful tool of social and political manipulation. Spinoza’s analysis is parallel. The Appendix to *Ethics* 1 argues that human beings make gods in their own image, then invent rituals to ensure that “God might love them above all the rest.” The *Theologico-Political Treatise* traces the origin of religion in general and superstition in particular to the hopes and fears attendant upon ignorance and self-preservation, and Spinoza argues that religion is a formidable means of social and political engineering. For both thinkers, the political imaginary of religion recalls Machiavelli. Spinoza for his part also draws on the Farabian strand of Jewish and Islamic political philosophy via Maimonides and others.

While the critique of religion as anthropomorphic fantasy and tool for political domination is often taken as a quintessentially modern claim, and the overcoming of religion is seen as a modern or Enlightenment goal, the fact that neither Hobbes nor Spinoza envisions an end to, or definitive exit from, religion complicates the usual narrative of secularization. Both argue that religion arises from and sustains itself on the uncertainties of self-preservation and the limits of knowledge and reason. Religion is the paradigmatic imaginative discourse for both philosophers, and imagination, far from going away, is a permanent feature of human existence. Accordingly, the question for both philosophers is, What forms of religion are conducive to a sustainable state, and how does religion work politically? What forms of imaginative life, in other words, are conducive to a sustainable state?

Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s emphasis on religion’s political role marks them as thinkers of political affect as much as political rationality. Each offers us resources for understanding the imaginative and affective constitution of the state as foundational, and this emphasis on imagination and affect reflects their distinctive equation of right and power. Religion turns out to be associated with freedom as well as domination, and the mechanisms of state and religion stand in quite a complex relationship. Most interestingly, Spinoza clearly grasps that even an Erastian sovereign who controls a state religion faces a daunting task. Much as religion can provide formidable political cohesion (e.g. the Mosaic Hebrew commonwealth) via devotion and obedience, it can also generate theological hatred and civil war. The reason is that religious images originate in affective ambivalence and instability, namely the cycle of hope and fear, and the image of God as a free and omnipotent monarch who determines our fate and whom we must obey perpetuates that ambivalence. Thus even the sovereign who aims to manage religion to make it support rational and prudential political goals turns out to be forced to play with fire.

Diane Zetlin

The Achille's heel of patriarchy: Hobbes and Harvey.

The friendship between Thomas Hobbes and William Harvey is often acknowledged and rarely discussed. In this paper, I suggest that they shared (either explicitly or implicitly) common disturbing discoveries about the foundations of patriarchal rule. Harvey's flawed theory of generation was built from the empirical observation that no traces of semen could be found in the uterus and that foetal growth was explained better by epigenesis than preformation. If semen could not be found as a vital contributor to foetal mass, and the growth of the foetus was not preformed by the seminal fluid (even if some part was played in Galen's view by the weaker female semen), then the physiological foundation of patriarchy was shaken to its core. For his part, Hobbes sought to take civil society back to its genesis and to recompose its parts. In doing so, he came to the no less startling discovery that in the state of nature, men and women were equal. Indeed, although I will not explore this here, women were the first lords since they were first to have dominion over their offspring. The point is that this undermined the basis of patriarchal rule as natural right in as fundamental a way as Harvey's physiological 'discoveries.'

Both Hobbes and Harvey retreated from the precipice of these discoveries. Hobbes attempted to explain how women might lose dominion before surrendering the argument in *Leviathan* to the bald proposition that women were ordained by God to be men's help. Harvey, still partly in thrall to both Aristotle and Galen, speculated the male semen is so perfect a substance that it must play its part 'at a distance.'

In the first part of this paper, I explore what we know (or can speculate) about the friendship and intellectual influence between these two men from biographical data and some textual analysis. In the second part, I elaborate on their anti-patriarchal 'discoveries' and their recantations (if they can be described so). In the third part, I discuss two possible explanations for the contradictions in Hobbes's and Harvey's positions. They could be, in the sense that Bruno Latour (1993) describes it, caught between what they believe to be true in nature and what they believe to be social facts. The alternative explanation is that they are practicing a kind of Straussian esoterism, clothing their true views in conventional garb.

Hannah Lingier

Piety, poetry, philosophy: imagination in David Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*

Imagination takes up an ambivalent position in early modern philosophy. It is often considered as an antagonist of reason and the source of dangerous illusions; however, it is also the home of human creativity and invention. David Hume struggled with this ambiguity throughout his career. He considered the imagination as essential to our memory, senses and understanding, but an overactive imagination easily gives rise to madness or the superstitious religions he so despised. Although Hume's account of the imagination is crucial for his view on religion and philosophy, this has received surprisingly little attention in scholarship (a recent exception is Timothy Costelloe's, *The Imagination in Hume's Philosophy* (2018)). In this paper I address this topic through Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (1779) and argue that, while the text aims to show the irrationality of religion, it also illustrates the pervasive effects of the imagination on human thought in general and thereby partly relieves religion of its unique and negative position. The imagination, as an inherent part of human nature, is the source of all philosophical systems, and while its lack of boundaries may be dangerous, it also enables us to give shape to our world.

Firstly, I argue that the *Dialogues* main focus, rather than a discussion on metaphysics and epistemology, is the role philosophy and religion play in life and their impact on one's behavior. It is not about discovering truth or providing rational foundations for one's beliefs, but about the need for and choice of a system that brings structure, comfort and/or sense to life. Secondly, despite their diverging views regarding these systems, the three protagonists are connected by their dependence on and appeal to the imagination. In his skeptic refutation of both dogmatist and natural religion, Philo shows that both have overstepped the narrow boundaries of reason. However, he himself is in many ways a subject of the 'empire of the imagination'. In his argumentation he makes use of fanciful thought experiments, the authorities he invokes are famous poets and his ultimate acknowledgement that 'a design strikes everywhere the most careless thinker' illustrates the imagination's intrinsic tendency to connect and unite.

The *Dialogues* is a key text to understand Hume's complex position regarding the irrationality of mankind. While exposing religion as a dangerous and unwarranted fiction, he also recognized our inclination to find unity and meaning in seeming contingency. Moreover, he acknowledges that both the dogmatist and the skeptic depend on the imagination to give shape to their world. The text is paradigmatic of the ambiguous position of the imagination in early modern thought, but through this concept, it also transcends the tension between reason and irrationality. Creative man takes center stage, whatever his creation may be.

John Thrasher

The Puzzle of Hume's Politics: Realism and Idealism in Humean Conventionalism

The key puzzle of Hume's political thought is how his political writing, especially as it appears in his *Essays* and his *History of England*, is related to his larger philosophical project. We argue that the key to resolving this puzzle lies in two of Hume's more surprising and controversial essays "The Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" and "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science." Defending a view, we call normative conventionalism that we argue can be distilled from those essays, we show that Hume's politics carves out an important space for normative political theorizing. Furthermore, we argue that appreciating this aspect of Hume's view allows us to do two things. First, it allows us to see Hume as not just a "utilitarian," a "skeptic," a "conservative," an "empiricist," or a "realist," but rather as someone whose political thought doesn't neatly fit into any of these boxes, but is, nevertheless, coherent. This coherent standalone political theory is also as an extension of his broader philosophical project. Furthermore, we argue that appreciating the contours of Hume's political thought and the relationship it bears to his philosophical project offers a way to rise above some of the more contentious debates in contemporary political theory, especially those between the so-called realists and idealists. We argue that the key to unpacking both of these things lies in a novel account of how Hume's wide-ranging work is synthesized in two of his more surprising essays.

Mikko Yrjönsuuri

Personhood and moral agency - origins of the early modern theories

The paper examines the origins of the theories personhood put forward by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, respectively. Although Boethius's definition of person as an individual substance of rational nature remained unchallenged throughout the Latin middle ages, it was not taken to exhaust what is at issue in personhood, but both the Hobbesian and the Lockean theories have their roots in the medieval discussions. For understanding this, it is crucial to see that both Hobbes and Locke thought of personhood in terms of moral agency. Indeed, it is noteworthy that even Boethius locates his discussion in the context of agency when drawing the etymology of the word from the masks actors use in theatrical plays. In a more explicit manner, Hobbes's discussion is related to how Pope Innocent IV used the term "*persona ficta*" to refer to the university of Paris in a context where the substantial issue was moral responsibility. Also this usage derives from the deeper idea that persons are to be seen as sources of agency. Locke's view can be interestingly compared to Peter John Olivi's reflexive definition of the concept 'person'. According to Olivi, a person is a thing having its "own good" (*bonum proprium*), to be strived for through action. As Olivi makes clear, one cannot be a person without free will.

Peter Anstey

Political Principles and the Separation of Powers

This paper charts the manner in which the theory of principles was applied to the problems of civil disorder and political liberty from Aristotle and Polybius, to Montesquieu and the founding fathers of the American Constitution. It is well known that the popular solution to the problems of civil disorder and political liberty, namely, the Separation of Powers, derives from Aristotle's *Politics*. This paper takes the Aristotelian influence a step further by arguing that the early moderns framed the theory of the Separation of Powers in terms of the theory of knowledge acquisition that is set out in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. There is a very real sense then, in which The Constitution of the United States of America is an Aristotelian legacy.

Margaret Schabas

David Hume as a Proto-Weberian: Commerce, Protestantism, and Secular Culture

David Hume wrote prolifically and influentially on economics and was an enthusiast for the modern era of manufacturing and trade. As a non-Christian and possibly a non-believer, Hume positioned commerce at the vanguard of secularism. I here argue that Hume broached ideas that gesture toward those offered by Max Weber in his famous Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-5). Hume discerns a strong correlation between economic flourishing and Protestantism, and he points to a “spirit of the age” that is built on modern commerce and fuelled by religious tolerance. The Roman Catholic Church, by contrast, came under considerable attack by Hume, for fostering intolerance and draining and diverting funds. Hume went beyond a mere correlation and recognized several of the Protestant dispositions that later appealed to Weber: an increased work ethic and a tendency to promote frugality, enterprise, and investment. A neo-Weberian literature now points to additional factors, the spread of literacy and the fostering of a network of trust among strangers, both of which Hume makes note. Insofar as modern commerce both feeds upon and fosters more liberties and representative government, Hume also linked these with the advent and spread of Protestantism. My aim is not to suggest that these arguments have merit—there is good reason to question each and every assertion under the historical microscope—but rather to highlight the broader religious and cultural context in which Hume’s economics was broached.

Martina Reuter

The Role of the Other in Poulain de la Barre's Account of Self-Knowledge

In his *De l'éducation des dames pour la conduit de l'esprit, dans les sciences et dans les moeurs: Entretiens* (1674), François Poulain de la Barre devotes one of five conversations entirely to the topic of self-knowledge. His perspective is explicitly Cartesian and he defends the possibility of self-knowledge against those contemporaries who (like François La Rochefoucauld) denied it. Poulain combines his discussion of self-knowledge with his Cartesian critique of prejudice and argues that "the tyranny of opinion" is the greatest obstacle to true self-knowledge. This is particularly true in the case of women, who are subjugated by culturally and politically established male prejudice.

Simultaneously with this criticism, "the other" seems to play a constructive role in the work *De l'éducation des dames*, where four people seek self-knowledge in conversation with each other. In this paper I take a closer look at the roles of other human beings in Poulain's criticism as well as in the structure of his book. I want to explicate and analyze the potential tensions between these roles. It is interesting to take a closer look at Poulain's thought in a (very loosely constructed) framework of recognition theory not least because this approach can shed new light on why Simone de Beauvoir chose to cite him as an epigraph for her *Le deuxième sexe* (1949).

Raman Sachdev

Descartes and Skepticism

Descartes was not a skeptic. Yet, in recent scholarship, emphasis has been placed on Descartes' skepticism, specifically his use of hyperbolic doubt in the First Meditation. For example, in *The History of Scepticism*, Richard Popkin describes Descartes' philosophical project as having been primarily motivated by a skeptical threat, and Popkin supports this interpretation mostly by relying on a particular reading of the First Meditation. My paper critiques such an interpretation and, in doing so, also provides what I believe to be a more plausible reading of Descartes. In this paper, I present my interpretation of Descartes' views on skepticism. First I highlight some of the areas in Descartes' *Discourse on Method* that reveal the influence of skepticism on his thought. Then I analyze a selection of remarks from the correspondence in which Descartes makes judgments or states his opinions about both the skeptics and skepticism. I argue that such remarks display Descartes' attitude of contempt for skeptical philosophy. Finally, since Descartes associates the skeptics with the activity of constant and total doubting and yet presents scenarios that seemingly arise from extreme doubt—like the malicious demon hypothesis—I look at what Descartes says in the correspondence about his own use of doubt in his published works. Descartes distances himself from the skeptics because he claims that whereas they doubt everything and, in so doing, act heretically, he uses doubt for a noble purpose. I suggest that although Descartes is influenced by skeptical ideas and considers skeptical argumentation to be useful, his strategic use of such argumentation should not lead us to believe that he condones skepticism. Quite the contrary, most of his remarks on the subject show that Descartes is highly critical or dismissive of sceptical ideas. Therefore, I argue that it is more accurate to characterize Descartes as a philosopher generally opposed to skepticism.

Daryl Ooi

Liberty, Necessity and the Problem of Evil in Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding

In Section 8 of *The Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (1748), David Hume provides an argument for the compatibility of liberty and necessity. At the close of Section 8, Hume considers a potential objection to his argument. The objection is presented as a *reductio ad absurdum*, arguing that Hume's theory of compatibilism should be rejected on the grounds that it leads to two potential propositions, which are described as impious or absurd: either (a) that there are no human actions which are criminal or, (b) there are actions which are criminal and the Deity is morally blameworthy for determining criminal actions. In response, Hume provides a defence of his theory against the potential objection. He agrees that (a) is absurd and demonstrates how his theory of compatibilism does not, in fact, lead to (a). In response to (b), however, Hume declares that the discussion of such a topic exceeds all the powers of philosophy. Commentators have disagreed with regard to the effectiveness and sincerity of Hume's responses, especially with regard to (b) which is often understood as a version of the 'problem of evil'. While commentators like John Brice (2008) think that Hume's response is unclear, commentators like Tamás Demeter (2011) have argued that Hume really believed that philosophy is ill-equipped to provide us a response to the 'problem of evil' and commentators like Paul Russell (2002) have argued that Hume agreed that his theory did, in fact, lead to the impious conclusion of (b).

In this paper, I will examine the potential objection to Hume's theory and discuss the relevant version of the 'problem of evil'. I will argue that Hume's philosophy of religion gives us good reason to think that Hume really believed that a response to (b) exceeded all the powers of philosophy. I will first discuss the argument of the 'problem of evil' and provide an analysis of Hume's response. Borrowing from the *Fragment on Evil*, sections in the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (1779) and other sections of the *Enquiry*, I will then argue that the 'problem of evil', for Hume, cannot be answered through philosophical reasonings. In so doing, I demonstrate how, at the end of Section 8 of the *Enquiry*, Hume's theory of compatibilism remains unfazed by Hume's potential objector.